DYNAMICS OF RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN SOMALIA: ALLIES AND OPPONENTS

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Abstract
In Somalia, religion is absorbed in the culture, while nationalism exhibited in the last century. The relationship between religion and nationalism has been opposing, contradictory, and ongoing over the centuries. This article examines the changing relationship between religion and nationalism in Somalia. In doing so, it traces how nationalism formed among Somalis using religion as a mobilization tool, the divorce between religion and nationalism, the decline and fall of Somali nationalism, and finally, the rise of radical Islamists. By employing a historical approach, the article argues that religion and nationalism have a dynamic relationship in Somalia, both: positive and negative relationships. In a specific time, religion and nationalism cooperated to mobilize the community against colonials; in overtime, religion and nationalism behaved as opponents competing with each other. Thus, this article aims to contribute to contemporary perspectives on how religion and nationalism can collaborate to achieve a specific objective.

Keywords: Religion, Nationalism, Somalia, Dervish.

1. Introduction

Globally, religion and nationalism are considered not only as an invisible social cohesion force, but also an opposing and conflicting forces. There are some arguments that nationalism is a substitute alternative for religion and can hold people of different beliefs in one nation. In this modern world, nationalism is believed to be a secular ideology that plays a critical role in shaping social life. Religion, one of the central pillars of social life, is losing its impact over nationalism in many parts of the world. However, in some cases, religion and nationalism are back up to each other. Some arguments show that religion and nationalism could handle one another and have been used as a mobilization tool. Globally religious nationalism is available in every religion.

However, an open question falls to the sustainability of the positive relationship between religion and nationalism. Less is known about the dynamics of religion and nationalism in Somalia. This article attempts to show how the relationship between religion and nationalism have been changing over time. The piece consists of several sections—first, the historical background of Islam in Somalia. In this part, the arrival of Islam, in addition to various main events in Somalia, is discussed. Secondly, the appearance of colonials triggered the cohesion of religion and nationalism as a combined force that fought against the colonials and paved the way for Somali nationalism. Third, the fall of dervishes besides secular Somali nationalistsstriving for a modern state caused the divorce between religion and nationalism. Also, themilitary government of Somalia between 1969-1991 exacerbated the fragile relationship between religion and nationalism and contributed to the grievances of religious figures when it took socialism. Finally, the fall of Somali nationalism due to various layers and the rise of radical Islamists is discussed.

2. Historical Background of Islamic Religion in Somalia

Somalia locates in the Horn of Africa, bordering Ethiopia to the west, Kenya to the southwest, north to the Gulf of Aden,and the Indian Ocean to the east. Somali people are homogeneous with uni-religion (Islam, Sunni, Shafi'ite rite), uni-language (Somali), uni-ethnic (Somali), and almost the same culture.Somalis are consideredamong the earliest people in Africa who accepted the Islamic religion. The Islamization of the Somali peninsula was gradual through assimilation and cultural infusion. It provided the Somali people with a wordy outlook the vibrancy, and partial changes in their modes of production in the religious settlements and urban trading centers (Upshur, Terry, Holoka, & Cassar, 2011).

As early as 632, The exiles of the Riddah (apostasy wars), mainly from Oman, settle in Banadir[1].Moreover, later move to the hinterlands through the waterways of the Shabelle and the Juba, laying the foundation for the early Islamic centers of Afgoye, Bali, Harar, and others(Mukhtar, 2003, p. xxv).The strategic significance ofSomalia attracted the eyes of Islam rulers. Again, in 700, Caliph Abdul Malik Ibn Marwan of the Umayyads sends an expedition to the East African coast to conquer Mogadishu and secure its *kharaj,* or annual tribute. Later on, Abu Ja'far al-Mansur, of the Abbasids, appoints a *na'ib*(viceroy) to collect taxes and supervise the teaching of Islam in Mogadishu in 755(Mukhtar, 2003, p. xxvi). However, the adoption of Islam and the existence of Islamic educational institutions did not prevent a conflict between Somalis and Islamic leaders. The disputes came after a group of successionist Somali towns refused to pay the taxes to the Abbasids. Punitive warns from the Muslim Caliph Harun Al-Rashid were received in 804, then 50,000 men were sent to crush and compel the successionist to pay the taxes in 829.

The 14th century was a turning point to the Somalis and their fellow Muslims in the Horn of Africa. The hostility between the Muslims and Christians,mainly in Abyssinia,[2] began. The Abyssinian empire wanted to conquer the Muslim sultanates of Ifat, Bali, Dawaro, Harar, Fatajar, and Hadya to pay tribute. The development of these conflicts contributed to the significant confrontations between the East African Muslims led by Imam Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Ghazi (Ahmed Gurey)[3],and Christian ruled the Ethiopian empire. There had been numerousfierce confrontations between the two sides.Thus, Ahmed Gurey methodically understood the military tactics of the Ottomans and managed to invade Ethiopia in 1529; however, the war continued until 1543, because the Portuguese Empire sent its troops to Massawa port to support the Christians. Both Muslims and Christian were receiving technical and military support from their Muslim and Christian allies. Ottomans supported Muslims; on the contrary,the Portuguese were helping the Christians by deploying armies led by Dom Christoval da Gama to Ethiopia and defeated the Muslims after wounding Imam Ahmed Guray, who later died(Upshur et al., 2011). After the defeat, Imam Ahmed's Adal Empire never fallen into the hands of his Christian enemies.

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[1]*Banadir/Benadir is an administrative region in south-eastern Somalia. it covers the same areas as the city of Mogashishu, Somalia's capital. It is bordered to the northwest by the Shabelle river, and to the southeast by the Indian Ocean.*

[2]*Abyssinia is currently known as Ethiopia from its origins in Biblical times.*

[3] *Ahmed Gurey (left-handed in the Somali language) was born in the port city of Zeila in Northern Somalia, which then becomes a part of Adal Empire. He was the leader of Muslim Sultanates in East Africa and conquered most of the Abyssinian lands.*

However, in 1870, Egypt occupied the Somali coast from Zeila to Cape Guardafui during Egyptian domination, which took place under Ismail Pasha[4](I M Lewis, 2017).Somalis had several livelihood activities to manage their lives. A significant population of Somalis were pastoralists, whereas coastal cities hosted a less but more developed society, while the interior pastoralists and cultivators pursued their traditional way of life, the coastal towns suddenly became beehives of activity and international intrigue as Britain, France, and Italy, as well as Turkey and Egypt, to a lesser extent, showed renewed interest in the Horn (Sheik-Abdi, 1977).

Even though Somalis characterize a single Islamic sect (Sunni), there are various Islamic Dervish Orders (tariqa): Qadiriyyah, Ahmediyyah, Salihiyyah, and Rifaiyyah are the most common. Qadiriyyah, founded by Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1077- 1166), the "most popular Islamic Saint," is the most popular order and found all over the Mohammedan Muslim world. Harrar, Mogadishu, and Brava (Barawe) were the main centers that Qadiriyyah commenced to spread. According to Lewis2017, the other Islamic Dervish Orders based on the educations and practices of Ahmed ibn Idriss al-Fasi (1760 – 1832), hisleading school located in Mecca. Having the ambition to attract as many followers, they worked hard to influence and guide the standard of Islamic knowledge. Ahmediyyah bears the name of the founder, was submitted to Somalis mainly through Merca's Sheikh Ali Maye Durogba. Another of ibn Idris's pupils, Ibrahim Ar-Rashid, who claimed to propagate the true Ahmediyyah, founded the Rashidiyyah. However, he is crucial only through his pupil, Mohammed ibn Salih, who, in 1887, formed the Salihiyyah with its seat in Mecca (I M Lewis, 2017). Qadiriyyah was not that organized compared to Salihiyyah, which was closer to the school in Mecca. The least common, Rifaiyyah order is found among the Arabs who moved to Somalia; however, not widely spread among the Somali community.

Although, Salihiyyah motived anti-colonial resistance led by Sayid Mohamed AbdulleHassan in the early 20th century remained unsuccessful. The contemporary Islamic movementsin Somalia started in the mid-1970s when the Somali Republic joined the Arab League. The first Islamic group that was formed is the *Wahdat Shabab al Islami*(the Islamic Youth Unity, in Somali known as *Waxda*) and the *Jama'atAhlalIslami* (*al-Ahli*) who were inspired by the example of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and wanted to apply Islamic principles in an independent, modernizing Somali state (Pranger, 2002). This group had an

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[4]*Ismail Pasha, known as the magnificent (31ˢᵗ December 1830 – 2 March 1895), was the Khedive of Egypt and Sudan.*

active role and gained popularity in the northern regions (currently Somaliland) when the Somali army destroyed the urban cities; because that time, theydelivered social services, distributed food, and medics, built schools, and disseminated Islam publicly.

The second group is Al-Ittihad al-Islam (The Somali Islamic Union). This neo-Salafist movement publicizes itself on September 22, 1991, in the United Kingdom. To avoid the military tightness and brutality of the government, Al-Ittihad al-Islam remained a secret organization for decades. The first of its published eight objectives is the establishment of the Islamic State and others includethe rejection of all *Jahili (un-Islamic) polity,* the attainment of Islamic justice, the establishment of peace in society, a well-planned economy,propagation of Islam, and war against all devious beliefs, *Bida*(Abdurahman Abdullahi, 1992, p. 114).According to Abdullahi (1992), after establishing an Islamic State, their ultimate aim was to create a strong army that would never become an ally to the non-Islamic political forces. Although the group participated in the Somali civil war in various locations, later, they were defeated.

The third Islamic group was Al-Harakat Al-Islamiyyah fi Al-Somal (The Islamic Movement in Somalia). The former name of the group Al-Islam first appeared in Saudi Arabia in 1978 and publicized their existence in the journal, *Al-Mujtama al-Islam* in Kuwait. Ideologically and institutionally, the group considers belonging to the Hassan Al Banna's*Ikhwan al-Muslimun*(The Muslim Brotherhoods),founded in 1928 in Egypt. Referring the message of the founder, Hassan Al Banna, the group's moto could be described as "a Salafiya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic institution like a company and a social idea(Moaddel & Karabenick, 2013, p. 59).The group'smain regional objective was to return the Somali people to an Islamic way of life in all its aspectsunder an Islamic state and to unify the efforts of the Somali people toward achieving that goal. It also aims at unifying all Muslim nationalities in the Horn ofAfrica(Adurahman Abdullahi, 1992, p. 116).

3. The Arrival of Colonials and Dervishes' Religious Nationalism

In the medieval period of Islamic history, the Somali peninsula hosted various city-states and nomadic sultanates. Nevertheless, Somali people organized into clans who share geographical locations. *Tol iyoXeer*(group and law) was the alternative solution to daily life misunderstandings and conflicts. Tribalism and religion are crucial to social cohesion and identity among Somalis. Thus, Somalis shaped a society in which Ibn Khaldun explains as an essential kind of community. Ibn Khaldun, a sociologist of Islam, notably Islam as

manifested in the arid zone, an environment that encourages tribalism by favoring nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralism and which hinders centralizing political tendencies (Gellner, 1983, p. 89).

Late in the 19th-century European colonials invaded and divided Somalis into five parts; Italian Somaliland (Southern Somalia), British Somaliland (Now, Somaliland), French Somaliland (Djibouti), Western Somalis "Ogadenia" in Ethiopia, and Northern Front District (NFD) in Kenya.Behind the imperial partition of Somalia lay varying motives. The principal concern of Britain was to preserve the northern Somali coast as a supplier of meat and other commodities for her Aden garrison, which, given the rising importance of the Red Sea to British plans in the East, wasconsidered vital to the defense of British India(Samatar, 1982, p. 91). French being defeated in Egypt by the British in the 1880s, intended facilitation of naval communication in the Red Sea to secure their imperial interest with the Indochina, and linking Gulf of Aden to their importance in equatorial Africa. Unlike the other colonial powers, Italy greedily needed to survive and gain any kind of land in the shore of oceans. Although some of the clans normalized living with the colonials, religiously strict Somalis started grieving, grudging, and showing sentiments against the colonials. A differentiation of faith, the taxes which the colonials imposed, and the centralization of power to control Somalis ignited the disagreements.

Regardfully, some of the Muslim African people showed greediness to freedom and opposition to colonization, which lead to the rise of religious nationalism. Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu (2013) defines religious nationalism as a social movement that claims to speak in the name of the nation, and that defines the nation in terms of religion. The theme of history in this period is characterized by the role of the Sufi brotherhood and their charismatic leadership.Algerian Muhammed Bin Ali es Senusi founded the Senusism movement in 1887.

Sanusi is an active movement in Northern African countries, particularly in Libya.

Missionary, colonialism, backwardness, lack of Central authoritarianism, and depression contributed to the formation of Sufism that proposes unique solutions.The increasing facts of missionary, colonialism, backwardness, lack of central authoritarianism, and depression accelerated a Sufi formation that offers its own solutions at a time of increasing depression(Ziadeh, 2006).The Sanusiya order mobilized society to respond to the colonials. Sanusiya leaders who tried to prevent tribal wars and family fights by transferring the center of the movement Inland have made an equal appeal against all tribes (Özköse, 2013).On the other hand, the Sudanese Mahdia typified this spirit of millennialism, but traits of it can be

detected in the reformist movements of the Uwaysiya of Sheikh Uways Mohamed of East Africa, and the Somali (Saalihiya) dervishes, and the Sanusi's of Libya(Samatar, 1982, p. 95).Religious nationalism represents a world-view in which the nation is glorified and idolized (Furseth & Repstad, 2006, p. 104).

   Similarly, Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, born in 1856, a Somali scholar who went to several countries for*rihlah* (search for religious knowledge) and came back from Saudi Arabia, where he wasinfluencedSalihiyyaorderunderMohammed Salih, finally arrived in Somalia. During his time in Port Sudan, he met with the former Mahdist general Uthman Al Diqna. İt is arguable that Sayid might have been inspired by the Mahdist to start a *jihad*against colonials in Somalia. Although he met challenges from the Qadiriyya, he strived to mobilize the community through religious nationalism. Emile Durkheim, as one of the founding fathers of sociology, argued that there is no precise distinction between nationality and religion (Durkheim, 1912). Although there are some arguments about a difference between nationality and nationalism, however, among the Somalis, religion playsan excellent mobilization tool for nationalism. Skillfully, Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan started his projectusing the religion as a mobilization tool for nationalism and strong opposition against the British colonials as well as the Ethiopian Empire. Culturally, Somalis are defined as an oral society that transmits stories through poems and songs. Hassan was one of the greatest poets in Somali history. He used them against his enemies to express his love for religion, nationalism, and *jihad*. To persuade his vision, he sent letters to the clan leaders. One of the letters says:

> "Unbelievers have invaded you in your country, to corrupt you and to corrupt your religion, and to force you to believe their religion, supported by their governments, their arms, and their numbers. But your faith in God and your dignity is sufficient arms. Do not, then, flee from their troops, nor the greatness of their arms; God is stronger than they"(Said S. Samatar, 1982, p. 116).

According to integration theories, the availability of specific institutions (religion, legal,economy) secures social cohesion that enhances the comprehensive and coordinated tasks societies' other sub-tasks. Durkheim, Parsons, and Bellah emphasize that religion helps the social system to sustain stability and equilibrium(Furseth & Repstad, 2006, p. 152).Hassan's religious nationalism seemed to be successful.Thousands of Somalis joined his movement for freedom against the colonials. At that moment, a prolonged war started in

1899-1920. Hassan prepared, trained, and motivated his armies through *jihad.* So, before taking any assault, he tried to warn and sent a letter to the British colony in 1889 and said:

> This is to inform you, you have done whatever you have desired, and you have oppressed our ancient religion without cause ... Now choose for yourself. If you want war, we accept it, but if you want peace, pay the fine(Samatar, 1982).

The letter amazed the British colony because they were not expecting that nomads can warn them to leave or pay taxes in their colonizing lands. However, reactions and responses from the British colony ignited the war between religious Somali nationalists "Dervish" and the British colonies. Hassan was successful for creating the Somali nationalism through religion. The British colony saw Somalis as divided nomads and pastoralistswith no central authority but had friction and disagreementson pasture and water for their livestock, which sometimes claimed their lives. However, they did not add to their account of how dangerous Somalis are regarding religion and nationalism. In his book "*Warrior: Life and Death Among the Somalis*" by a Gerald Hanley, a British soldier who worked in Somalia during the war with Hassan's Dervishes mentions his experience about the Somalis. He says:

> "Youcannot beat them.They have no inferiority complexes, no wide-eyed worship of the whiteman's ways, and fear of him, of his guns or his official anger. They are a race to beadmired, if not hard to love (Hanley, 2004).

In postcolonial times, Hassan was a symbol of Somali hero and proto-nationalist even his poems are studied in the schools. Hersi observed that it is because the Sayyid's fight against clan fissures and his nearly successful campaigns to rally pan-Somali resistance to colonialism that present-day Somalis and some writers consider him as the inspirer and symbol of modern Somali nationalism (Hoehne, 2016). Although all Somalis were not united and supported Hassan's dervishes but instead worked with the colonials, Hassan's steps laid down the Somali nationalism, which became more energetic two decades after his death and contributed to the Somali independence and governance.

4. The Dervishes' Aftermath and the Rise of Secular Nationalism

About three centuries ago, there is still widespread agreement that modern nationalism was an inherently secular phenomenon (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 2008; Jenkins, 1992). The relationship between religion and nationalism changed overtime and never remained stable. Nationalism emerged in Western Europe as a force to modernization that leads to the formation of the modern state, with centralized power, society morally and materially, and well-established borders that contain a community of citizens.There is no room left for

religion in this nationalist world: not only because God-oriented doctrines deprive man of his self-determination; but also because religious groups form communities with their leaders and identity feeling groups which virtually compete with those of the nation (Jaffrelot, 2009).

After two decades of armed struggle against the British, Italian and Ethiopian colonial, Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan was defeated in 1921 after the British colony used air bombardment against freedom fighters in the first time of African history. Other internal factors were contributing to the defeat of the dervishes. Although the Dervish movement suffered from internal divisions and desertions, with Sayid's autocratic rule often a source of dispute, he tried to bring other Somali clans on board (Hoehne, 2014).

The Somali nationalism did not vanish with the death of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan. It took another way to seek freedom and an independent great Somali state containing the divided five Somalis. Grievances over the place of Somalis in the various colonial administrations, as well as continued disregard for their national aspirations in the Horn, made the establishment of semi-political clubs and labor organizations imperative (Sheik-Abdi, 1977).

Somaliland National League (SNL) was the oldest party which existed intermittently under various titles in the British Protectorate since 1935 (Lewis, 1958); however, Somali Youth League (SYL), founded by thirteen youth on May 15, 1943, was the most popular nationalist group which would later become a political organization that led the country during the first decade of independence. From 1946 to 1948, the Somali Youth Club (SYC) grew from a small Mogadishu basedurban self-help organization into a burgeoning nationalist organization calling for the unification of all the Somali-speaking lands into Greater Somalia, changing its name to the 'Somali Youth League' (SYL) in the process (Barnes, 2007). According to Barnes 2007, In 1946, the British attempted to form a great nation of five Somalis (under British trusteeship), to lay the foundation for future Somali independence. SYL, which previously had limited and accessible political plans, sought to take advantage of Britain's new policy and expanded its original national project, confined to southern Somalia. SYL became the icon of modern Somali nationalism. UnlikeHassan's dervishes, SYL runs for the independence and establishment of the current Somali state based on the ideology of postcolonial states and secular ideology.

British Somaliland (Somaliland) took its independence from the British colony on June 26, 1960. In contrast, Italian Somaliland (Southern Somalia) get its independence from the Italian colony on July 1, 1960. It is worth mentioning that two parts of five Somalis united and

formed the Somali Republic on July 1, 1960. The united two Somali governments added the parliaments[5] together, likewise other institutions such as the armies. At independence, there had been four distinct legal traditions: Islamic Sharia or religious law, *xeer*Somali (Somali culture), Italian law, and English common law whereas, the challenge after 1960 was to meld this diverse legal inheritance into one system. At that moment, Somali nationalism was steadily increasing, and its rivalry to religion commenced to shine.

The role of religious functionaries began to shrink in the 1950s and 1960s as some of their legal and educational powers and responsibilities were transferred to secular authorities(Metz, 1992). The role of religious leaders considerably changes following the 1969 coup d'etat and the transformation to scientific socialism. According to Metz et al., 1993, Siad Barre, who came to power through coup d'etat, worked to persuade that this type of socialism applied to the principles of the Qur'an and criticized atheism. However, religious leaders who remained suspicious were warned engaging in politics. New controversial legal amendments were taken while some religious figures consider contrary to Islamic orders. The military regime reacted fiercely to criticism, executing some religious persons. The most famous incident occurred when 17 condemned the new family law. The Islamic scholars voiced their opposition concerning the regime's interference with the Islamic family law by introducing secular law overtly contradicting the Qur'anic verses (Abdurahman Abdullahi, 2017, p. 148). Unexpectedly, the government executed all of them. The execution of the Islamic scholar fueled the fragile relations between the religion and secular nationalist military.

The first decade of the military characterized the peak of Somali nationalism. During this period, the regime implemented successful projects. It mobilized the community to work for their country—the most successful plan, including writing the Somali language scripts and its rural development campaign. During the campaign, thousands of Somalis learned how to write and read the Somali language. Other successful projects across the country, including volunteering projects (*Iskaa wax u qabso). S*ongs, poets, and concerts encouraged the Somali

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[5]*The two parliaments represented the two local governments separately, British Somaliland Protectrate's parliament contained 33 members elected during the first elections in February 1960. While the Parliament of Italian Somaliland contained 90 members from the general elections of March 1959. Additionally, after the British won the second world, the British controlled all Somali regions except French Somali (Djibouti), however, in 1950 British colony handed over authority to Italy for the administration of the United Nation's Trust Territory of Somalia. The Southern Somalis were allowed to form their local government and promised to handle their independence within ten years, and it happened to get their independence in July 1960.*

nationalism which striving for a greater Somalia. In 1977/1978, the devastating war between Somalia and Ethiopia happened. In this war, Somalia intended to liberate the Somali region in Ethiopia. During the first phase of the war, Somalia released the Somali region in Ethiopia; however, the political misunderstanding between Somalia and the Soviet Union caused the Soviets to leave the country and help Ethiopia. Other countries such as South Yemen, Libya, and especially Cuba, who sent thousands of soldiers to the frontline, were supporting Ethiopia. Finally, Somalia lost the war and retreated. The disappointment of the war caused a failed military coup against Siyad Barre in April 1978.

   The disappointment of the war with Ethiopia, the failed coup attempt, the grievances of religious leaders along with clan competitions triggered the decline of Somali nationalism. It signaled the end of the Pan-Somalism project. After the failed coup in 1978, the first stage of the Somali civil war started. In a decade, there have been several armed oppositions against the military government, which caused the government to fall in 1991. The most popular armed groups were; Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Congress (USC), and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)[6]. Unfortunately, every one of those groups represented the interests of their clans and showed disloyalty to the nationalism. Meaningfully, some groups used clannism and religion to mobilize and recruit their soldiers. The disagreement between nationalism and religion in Somalia can be observed at this point. The opposition groups named themselves as *mujahideen* fighting against the secular nationalist military government that doomed the developmental direction of Somali politics and the precious Somali culture and religion. The regime also insisted it was defending the Somali nationalism and spread propaganda against

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[6]*The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), formerly known as the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia, is the first major rebel group to overthrow the Somali military government. It was founded by Colonel Abdullahi Yousuf Ahmed in 1978. He later became President of the Puntland State of Somalia (1998-2004) and President of the Federal Government of Somalia in 2004-2008. The SSDF operated the so-called regions of Puntland State of Somalia and some few other regions. The Somali National Movement (SNM) founded in London, the UK, in 1981,is the second oldest and longest-running group against the military government. It operated in the northern regions (British Protectorate of Somaliland), now known as Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991 when the central government collapsed. It is noteworthy that Somaliland has yet to receive international recognition. The United Somali Congress, later established in 1987, however, was one of the most powerful opposition groups in Somalia. It was led by Mohamed Farah Aideed. USC operated in the central regions of Somalia and in the surrounding areas of the capital Mogadishu. USC is the rebel group that succeeded in overthrowing President Mohamed Siad Barre after taking control of the capital Mogadishu in January 1991.The Somali Patriotic Movement is one of the youngest insurgents in Somalia and was founded in 1989. It was led by Ahmed Omar Jees and then Aden Abdullahi Nur Gabyow. It had great power in the southwestern regions of Somalia.*

the oppositions and their clans. The radical Islamists were taking advantage of the situation and kept running their businesses undercover. Simultaneously, after the fall of the military government, radical Islamist fueled the civil war by organizing armed militias and invading some regions in Somalia. The fall of the central government hibernated the Somali nationalism, on the country radical Islamists raised, but in a new shape, armed and robust.

5. The Development of Radical Islamists

The global rise of religious politics is found in every religious tradition, spurred on by the widespread perception that secular nationalism is an ineffective and insufficient expression of public values and moral community in a global era in which traditional forms of social identity and political accountability are radically transformed (Juergensmeyer, 2010). The Somali nationalism declinedthe fall of war with Ethiopia in 1977/78 subsequently. Finally, it disappeared along with the collapse of the central government in 1991. The Islamists who had been working in secret worked to fill the gap, implementing their prior planned strategies. From the 1940s, during the civil and military governments, nationalism was the primary tool for mobilization. It was believed that patriotism was a substitute for tribalism.Abdurahman Abdullahi (2017) argues that one of the main challenges that caused the failure of Somali nationalism was that secular Somali nationalists who run the government ignored two crucial pillars of social life among the Somalis; tribalism and Islam. Accordingly, after the collapse of the state, religion and tribalism were used to organize, mobilize, and recruit militias fighting for opposing tribes and radical Islamists.

  The tightness of the military regime restricted Islamists not influential enough to intervene in the politics of the day. Nevertheless, Al-Ittihad Al-Islam arose in the early 1980s from the merger of twoSalafist groups—Al-Wahdat, the northern-based group, and its southern counterpart, Al Ahli(Harun Maruf & Joseph, 2018, p. 23). The ultimate goal of Al-Ittihad was the formation of an Islamic state that guides the Somalis in the right way. Al-Ittihad spread its ideology and program as the icon for the restoration of the lost Islamic culture of the Somalis and broadened its armies into various regions in Somalia and, a lesser extent to the Somali region of Ethiopia. It is worth mentioning that Al-Ittihad in the Somali region of Ethiopia appeared as a political organization than the armed party in Somalia. The armed wing of Al-Ittihad confronted secular Somali militias, mainly United Somali Congress (USC), Hawiye clan dominated group led by General Mohamed Farah Aideed in Southern Somalia in 1991 as well as Somali Salvation Democratic Front, Darod clan representative militia in North Eastern regions (currently Puntland). Accordingly, the radical Islamists under

the shadow of *jihad*seemedlike the biggest threat to Ethiopia. Suddenly, the concerns of the Ethiopians did not take too long to come out, and Ethiopia invaded the Gedo region of southern Somalia in 1996. This unusual reaction to invading Somalia was the outcome of a series of deadly explosions and assaults occurred in the capital Addis Ababa whose responsibility was claimed by Al-Itihaad spokesman in Mogadishu(Ingiriis, 2018). Afterward, several armed conflicts between Al-Ittihad, the Somali militias, and Ethiopia, Al-Ittihad was severely defeated as a result of their limited military experience and short envisioned politics. Thus, Al-Ittihad opted to withdraw from the armed conflicts, but instead to work their other programs.

Southern Somalia experienced almost a decade of warlords, divided the capital into strata and chaos among them. Somaliland already declared its independence and formed one of the most peaceful places in East Africa. In contrast, North Eastern regions formed semi-autonomous Puntland State. The nationalism already vanished, common interest among the areas and warlords were absent, and the Islamists were waiting for an opportunity to the resurrect. However, this moment differently, they integrated into their clans, established courts that judge basic Islamic law requirements such as marriage and theft.To win public hearts and minds, Al-Itihaad aimed to provide justice, enforce Islamic laws and ensure that specific areas and zones of the capital city administered by the courts were safe and peaceful (Ingiriis, 2018).The courts coordinated, organized, and cooperated their activities in Mogadishu, so the people who were fed upon the warlords admired their justice and judgments. Thus, they formed their coalition of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).

The rise of the Union of Islamic Courts seemed a threat not only to Ethiopia, but the United States felt that suspected international terrorists are hiding in Somalia. Therefore, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), along with Ethiopia, supported the warlords to confront rising threats from the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu. Nevertheless, due to fierce battles, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) defeated the warlords and conquered the capital, Mogadishu. It was the first time since the fall of the military government in 1991 that only one dominant group controlled the capital, Mogadishu. Hence, residents in the capital of Mogadishu have been enjoying the peace they had for the first time in 15 years and provided moral and material support to the Islamic Courts. The Islamic Courts spread their administration to various regions in southern Somalia and opposed the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFGS), led by Abdullahi Yousuf Ahmed, and settled in Baidoa.

Nationalism was born as a modern ideology dedicated to the emancipation of man against every adverse force, including religion (Jaffrelot, 2009, p. 467). Such a secular definition of nationalism does not apply to the realities in Somalia because faith integrated into Somali culture. In some cases, religion has been the benchmark for the mobilization of Somali nationalism. Again, the Islamic Courts of Somalia worked hard to mobilize the citizens using religion as a nationalism tool. On the contrary, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia assembled its force with the support of Ethiopian troops to confront the Islamists. Here, it is arguable that two sorts of nationalism oppose each other- religious nationalism and secular nationalism in Somalia. However, none of them is successful and remains forever. Sayid Mohamed AbdulleHassan's religious nationalism was different from the Islamic Courts' new religious nationalism. Hassan's dervishes were opposing to colonials, whereas Islamic Courts against the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia,which was getting support from Ethiopia. Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was defeated, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) shifted to Mogadishu early in 2007. Although they were increasingly popular from the outset, the Union of Islamic Courts' (UIC) leaders lost the support they enjoyed when they defeated the warlords who were considered puppets for the US in the eyes of the Somali public, who came to find them as paid agents of the CIA(Ingiriis, 2018).

Among the Islamic courts, there have been radical Islamists, which would later become one of the fiercest terrorist organizations in the world- Al-Shabab. Following the defeat of the Islamic courts, they reorganized their group. They started ambush attacks to the government forces, Ethiopians, and the AMISOM[7]. Al-Shabaab controls parts of Somalia; it has been fighting for a decade and announced its affiliation with al-Qaeda in 2012. During this moment, they showed that Somali nationalism is an opposing force to Islam; instead, they use a word ofMuslim People (Ummah), which has no limitations. Al-Shabab invites and recruits foreign fighters to join their armed struggles against the Federal Government of Somalia. Contrarily, the Somali government mobilizesit's military and civilians the nationalism that has fallen during the civil war. The government reminds people to respond to Al-Shabaab's

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[7]*The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an African Union-led regional peace initiative approved by the United Nations Security Council. They have been mandated for peacekeeping, support for the Somali government, training Somali forces, and creating a stable environment for humanitarian aid organizations. AMISOM was announced on January 19, 2007, for a six-month initial period, following a resolution by the African Union's Peace and Security Council. Since this day, AMISOM is still operating in Somalia following several mandate extensions.*

acts of indiscriminate violence against the Somali people and to defend their country against international terrorists. Al-Shabaab outlawed every sign of nationalism, including the Somali flag, working for the government, so on.

6. Conclusions

Religion and nationalism are two powers in which their relationship has been evolved for a long time. Depending on the conditions, religion and nationalism can operate together in some circumstances and oppose to each other accordingly. Thus, the cooperative and exclusive relations between religion and nationalism are not stable. In some Muslim countries, religion was used for mobilization for nationalism against the colonials. Then religious nationalists gain popularity, support, and resource to confront the colonials. In Somalia, Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan of dervishes was the leading Somali nationalist that employed religion as a strategic plan to mobilize Somalis and confronted colonials. Modernization, a secular-based ideology, became an alternative to religious nationalism in Somalia and contributed to an annulment between religion and nationalism.

The military government's takeover of the power and declaration of the socialist Somali republic exacerbated the brittle relations between nationalism and religion, leading them into direct opponents after the military government executed some religious scholars who opposed its laws on a family. Thus, Islamists, including extremists, see nationalism as a secular project planned to inject the religious Somali people and remains suspicious. After the fall of the military government and Somali nationalism, religion gains its popularity. Various religious groups joined the political rivalries and fueled the consequence of the civil war, and more importantly, the competition between religion and nationalism in Somalia.

Religion and nationalism are, without a doubt, have a flickering relationship that allies and opposes depending on the current situation. Their role in society makes them a significant power that contributes to social cohesion. Finally, the conflict between religion and nationalism does not seem to be ending very soon. Contrary, each one will gain its popularity leaning on situation and locations.

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